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Build Homes Get a Better
Not Bombs Economy to Boot!
Richard Krushnic
Our nation has a rare opportunity to shift resourcesfrom military to civilian activities for
the nextfew years. A budgetpact is supposed to prevent transfers offundsfrom the mili-
tary to domestic programs during fiscalyears 1992 and 1993, but the pact is cracking in
light of the sudden collapse of the Soviet military and the dismemberment of the Soviet
Union. While jobs are lost when funds are shifted out of the military, the funds don't dis-
appear— they are usedfor alternative federal expenditures, payingfederal debt, or tax
reduction. Many alternative expenditure patterns are available to improve the quality of
life for middle-income and low-income citizens and the international competitiveness
ofour economy. If$25 billion a year were shifted into affordable housing development
and retention for a period ofyears, low- and moderate-income families and individuals
wouldfind housing to be much more affordable and available, homelessness would be
greatly reduced, and overall employment and economic output in the eastern Mas-
sachusetts region would increase.
Our nation has a rare opportunity to shift resources from military to civilian
activities for the next few years. The fiscal 1992 funding year, which began
October 1, 1991, might see such a shift. In a few weeks Congress and the administration
will probably take $1 billion of the military budget and use it for aid to the Soviet
Union. A budget pact is supposed to prevent transfers of funds from the military to
domestic programs during fiscal years 1992 and 1993, but the pact is cracking, and
powerful forces in the country and in Congress want the pact reexamined in light of the
sudden collapse of the Soviet military, and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union.
While jobs are lost when funds are shifted out of the military, the funds don't dis-
appear— they are used for alternative federal expenditures, paying federal debt, or
tax reduction. Either way, the dollars are used for other purposes that generate jobs
and economic activity. Many alternative expenditure patterns are available to
improve the quality of life for middle-income and low-income citizens and the inter-
national competitiveness of our economy. The better alternatives would be marked
improvements over the current alternative: too much money for the savings and loan
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bailout, the commercial bank bailout, wars (like Iraq and the Latin American "drug"
wars, which are really counterinsurgency wars), and a health care system that per-
mits unnecessary procedures, limits necessary procedures, and falls flat on preven-
tive health care.
Shifting federal resources from the military to human services, housing, economic
infrastructure, programs to increase international competitiveness, and environmental
protection would increase employment and economic output and improve the quality
of life. Former secretaries of Defense, many congresspersons, and numerous policy
institutions have concluded that the Department of Defense and the military compo-
nent of the Department of Energy should have their budgets cut in half over the
course of a decade. By some measures, military spending cuts have already begun.
Such a reduction amounts to roughly $150 billion a year in current dollars. Cuts would
be smaller at first but reach this level at the turn of the century or shortly thereafter.
If one sixth of that amount, $25 billion a year, were shifted into affordable hous-
ing development and retention for a period of years, low- and moderate-income
families and individuals would find housing to be much more affordable and avail-
able, and horhelessness would be greatly reduced. Greater Boston Jobs with Peace
(JWP) asked Boston voters in a 1987 referendum if they would like this to happen.
The voters said yes and asked the city to tell them what that would mean in terms of
additional housing services it could provide. The city's 1989 report in response to the
JWP referendum showed how Boston's share of such a shift in spending would meet
the city's affordable housing needs and increase overall employment and economic
output in eastern Massachusetts as well. 1
Of course, homelessness cannot be dealt with simply by making more affordable
housing available. Additional educational, employment training, counseling, advo-
cacy, and employment opportunities must also be provided. Supportive services,
abundant and less-expensive housing will not do the job unless a healthier economy
produces jobs and a correspondingly healthier tax base to support the services.
Most of our tax dollars go to the federal government, and half of those to the mili-
tary. The demise of the Soviet threat means that funds can be shifted to an alternative
federal spending pattern. Such an alternative pattern will both meet human needs and
improve the overall quality of life, including making the economy more internationally
competitive so that the improved quality of life can be sustained indefinitely.
Just as in the case of the housing example, shifting spending to such an alternative
pattern would result in a net increase in employment and output in New England.
Massachusetts would benefit more than the other large population state in the region,
Connecticut, and details of how Massachusetts would benefit are provided below.
The basic idea is contained in three principles: shifting some resources from the
military to building economic infrastructure (transportation, communications), edu-
cation, and programs and incentives to improve the international competitiveness of
the economy will benefit the entire nation; the highly diversified, high-tech nature of
the New England economy in general, and of Massachusetts in particular, predis-
poses the region to benefit from the new federal spending pattern; and in order to
truly improve the quality of life, the shift in resources must not be only to human
services, housing, and the environment, but also to the expenditures to improve the
economy; otherwise the humanizing impacts will be unsustainable.
The shift will not be without pain. Some specific military facilities (parts of bases
and private research and manufacturing) will not be successfully converted to civil-
PS
ian uses. Many military employees will not find alternative employment at compara-
ble pay or working conditions. By "military employee" I mean a full-time uniformed
or civilian employee of the Department of Defense (DOD) or the military parts of
the Department of Energy (DOE) and NASA, or workers in private research and
manufacturing supported by military DOD, DOE, or NASA research and procure-
ment dollars. But many military facilities and employees will come out fine. Much
more important, regional benefits from increased civilian employment and output
will far surpass the pain and provide jobs for many formerly in military work.
If this is what we want, we must fight for it, or it won't happen. A new military
strategy that perceives (or creates) military threats from newly industrialized nations
like Iraq, the savings and loan bailout, the commercial bank bailout, an unimproved
health care system, and the deficit are all partially unjustifiable alternatives that are
eating up the "peace dividend" as fast as it materializes. The military-industrial
sector is in the midst of creating a national security paradigm to justify continued
high military spending. This was one of the main reasons for the war against Iraq.
We will be told that we must be prepared for a succession of Saddam Husseins in
newly industrializing countries. This paradigm is unjustifiable and unsustainable. We
must educate the public and scale down the national security threat to realistic pro-
portions. The new paradigm merits rejection.
We can fight to pay $200 billion in savings and loan bailout costs by meeting the
costs sooner rather than later (by borrowing the money) and getting money back
from fraudulent S and L owners, or we can continue on the present course and pay
$600 billion for the bailout over the course of the next generation. We can bite the
bullet now and rationalize our health care system in an equitable manner, or we can
let the costly, wasteful, and unjust drift of the health care system continue. 2
The way to reduce the deficit is to use our scarce resources to make the economy
stronger and more competitive. Then the economy will generate sufficient revenue
to meet public expenditure requirements and reduce the deficit. Or we can continue
to dump too much money into the military, an unrationalized health care system,
and the bank bailouts, which will worsen the economy and weaken its ability to pro-
duce public tax revenue. The choices are partly in our hands. The money is there.
We must set our priorities right in order to get it.
Where Is the Federal Budget Battle?
In 1991, the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) committed the federal government to
a five-year budget deal. The budget was divided into two components: mandatory
(Social Security, bank deposit insurance, payments on the federal debt, and so on),
and discretionary. Discretionary spending was divided into three parts: defense, for-
eign aid, and domestic spending. Spending caps were set for each of the three parts
for each of the first three fiscal years (1991, 1992, and 1993).
The BEA enables Congress and the president to make changes within the defense
budget or among the various domestic programs, but does not allow a transfer of
funds from the military to domestic spending. Thus, a "budget wall" was erected to
prevent transfers from military to domestic spending.
The wall is removed for the fourth and fifth years of the pact (fiscal years 1994
and 1995). There is still an overall limit for discretionary spending, but funds may be
transferred from one of the three domestic components to another. Fiscal 1991
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ended September 30, 1991. Debate over the fiscal year 1992 budget has been going
on since early spring. The five-year BEA's deal for fiscal 1992 domestic spending is
defense, $291 billion, foreign aid, $15 billion, and domestic spending, $198.5 billion. 3
According to the Congressional Budget Office, the administration intends to
comply with the BEA's requirements for fiscal '94 and '95 by taking a slight "real"
cut in defense spending and a much larger real cut in domestic programs. The
administration proposes to go up from the 1992 and 1993 defense level of $271 bil-
lion to $295.5 billion in fiscal '94 and $298.5 billion in '95, increases of $4.5 billion
(1.5%) and $4 billion (1.4%). 4 These "absolute" increases are "real" declines
because price inflation reduces the value of each defense dollar more than the
budget increases provided for in terms of increased defense purchasing power.
If inflation is 5 percent, the FY '94 increase of 1.5 percent is short of the 5 percent
impact of inflation, and the "real" FY '94 defense budget will decline about 3.5 per-
cent. There would be a similar real decline in FY '95. In order to maintain real level
funding, the FY '94 defense budget would have to be increased not by the proposed
$4.5 billion but by $14.5 billion.
The Congressional Budget Office continues to inform us that in order to stay
within the overall FY '94 BEA budget cap for discretionary programs (defense, for-
eign aid, and domestic), the proposed real cut in defense (which allows for a $4.5
billion absolute increase) would force an absolute cut of $16.5 billion in foreign aid
and domestic programs combined. The corresponding real reduction for foreign aid
and domestic programs would be far larger than the absolute $16.5 billion reduction,
because the impact of inflation will make each of fewer dollars worth less. As if that
weren't bad enough, the administration intends to cut foreign aid and domestic
spending combined by a whopping $24.4 billion in absolute dollars in fiscal 1995. In
other words, the proposed slight real reduction in defense spending would mask an
enormous reduction in nondefense discretionary spending.5
Remember, however, that after FY '93 the five-year pact permits the administra-
tion and Congress to shift funds from defense to domestic programs. You might ask,
"Why can't Congress just reject the administration's proposal and shift additional
funds to domestic programs?" The budget pact was largely sold on the argument that
weapons systems development and projection were locked in by legally binding con-
tracts to the extent that possible research and procurement cuts were very limited.
The sudden collapse of the Soviet military threat has made U.S. citizens see the
defense levels in the five-year budget pact as too high. The Warsaw Pact has been
dissolved, the Soviet Union has been dismembered, unilateral Soviet disarmament
has continued apace, most top-secret Soviet military technology is up for sale, and
even President George Bush is bowing to pressure from resurgent Europe with his
unilateral stand-down from alert status for intercontinental bombers and land-based
missiles. There is clearly no need to keep the high defense levels of the budget pact,
yet the BEA's budget wall remains standing. The wall is under attack, however.
In fact, since the aborted summer coup in Moscow, it has become so fashionable
to bash the budget pact, that Republican Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
Secretary Jack Kemp said at the end of October 1991 that the pact should be aban-
doned for the fiscal year October 1, 1991, to September 30, 1992, and that funds
should be transferred from military to domestic programs.
In mid-October, Massachusetts Congressman Barney Frank's Operation Jericho
bill failed, but got a yes from a majority of House Democrats, and a total of 145
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votes. Frank's bill called for an FY '92 reduction of $11 billion in military spending,
half of which would be transferred to deficit reduction (debt repayments) and half to
increase domestic spending. A month before the vote on Frank's bill, liberal populist
presidential candidate Senator Tom Harkin floated an unsuccessful BEA-busting
FY '92 $3 billion transfer from military to domestic spending in the Senate.
The Bush administration resisted the extension of exhausted unemployment ben-
efits, but the president finally relented to a Congress with enough votes to override
his veto in the fall of 1991. This was technically a budget pact buster, so Congress
avoided the problem by funding it out of future unemployment insurance income.
Since House Speaker Tom Foley and Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski
were architects of the BEA, they are reluctant to scrap it after just one of its five
years. But House Budget Committee Chairman Leon Panetta, House Majority
Leader Richard Gephardt, and Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell are ready
to scrap the pact. The budget wall could fall soon and even release some FY '92
funds. At this writing it may still be more likely that the pact will be voted out in
fiscal '92, but that the budget won't be affected until fiscal '93.
House Budget Chairman Panetta, who is looking toward reductions in military
spending on the order of 33 percent to 40 percent over the next few years, wants
much of the funds shifted to education and health. Remember that even the admin-
istration is calling for a 25 percent cut during the 1990s.
In October 1991, the Brookings Institution released Decisions for Defense:
Prospects for a New Order, which calls for a 33 percent military budget cut over the
next few years. Their analysis of war-fighting needs leads them to recommend,
among other things:
• Halting production of the B-2 bomber
• Reconfiguring the B-l to a cheaper aircraft
• Deferring deployment of the small intercontinental ballistic missile
• Limiting the Trident program to eighteen submarines
• Focusing SDI on a ground-based system (much cheaper than a
satellite-based one)
• Killing the new C-17 transport aircraft before any production models are built
• Delaying production of next-generation combat aircraft
The budget wall will be brought down. Substantial funds will be transferred from
military to other uses. But what is to prevent those other uses from being more
wasteful spending on an unrationalized health care system, an S and L bailout that
makes little attempt to recover fraudulently obtained funds, or more tax breaks for
the rich? There are plenty of competing uses for the peace dividend.
The problem is that, just as in Massachusetts, so many of the groups that could
band together to pressure for sensible alternate uses are so busy fighting state
budget cuts and other immediate battles that they don't even have the big money—
the impending peace dividend— on their screens, much less a focus of their orga-
nizing activity. The sweeping changes with an impact on the national security arena
are coming so fast that the constituencies which should be shaping the direction of
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federal spending are going to see much of the peace dividend sail right over their
heads if they don't focus significant energy on the federal budget now.
Shifting Military Spending to Appropriate Alternatives
While many would like to see a shift in federal spending out of military production
and force maintenance and into other areas of spending designed to better meet
domestic needs, some people fear that the loss of military production jobs will some-
how leave us with an overall net negative impact on the economy and jobs. In fact,
shifting resources from the military to human services, housing, infrastructure, pro-
grams to increase international economic competitiveness, and environmental pro-
tection and abatement would increase overall employment and economic output,
not to mention the overall quality of our lives.
Shifting resources in this way increases employment because the nonmilitary
activities receiving more funds are all more-labor and less-capital intensive. They all
employ more people per billion dollars expended. Shifting resources in this way will
increase overall economic output as long as the alternative spending pattern is
designed to strengthen the economy.
In Massachusetts, such a shift would result in overall increased economic out-
put, because the characteristics of the area economy would attract the alternative
spending pattern's dollars. Assuming that human services and affordable housing
resources would be distributed according to need, New England in general, and
Massachusetts in particular, would be expected to get their population share of any
such shift in federal spending. The New England region has the oldest economic
infrastructure in the nation and would be expected to gain more than its population
share for rebuilding such economic infrastructure as roads and bridges.
Both direct federal expenditures (investment, education, training) and indirect
federal expenditures (investment tax credits) to improve international economic
competitiveness would benefit New England because any such federal programs
would emphasize high-tech manufacturing and highly professional and technical ser-
vices. These are the economic activities that will improve the international competi-
tiveness of regional and national economies in the future. New England in general
and Massachusetts in particular are well suited to capture their share or more of
such federal dollars, because these economic activities are already the strong points
of their economy. The region is also well positioned to capture more than its popula-
tion share of environmental protection and abatement dollars because of its strength
as an innovation center for high-tech and professional services.
Among the New England states, only in Connecticut— the most military procure-
ment-dependent state in the nation— might it take more than a few years to see a
significant net improvement in the economy from such a federal spending shift.
Long term, Connecticut would benefit as well from the local impact of economic
improvement at national and regional levels.
While Japan and Germany turn U.S. military technological advances into com-
mercial products that conquer the world's markets, the United States fails to capi-
talize on these advances of its own making. It is not merely coincidence that
persistently low military spending in those countries correlates with persistently high
advances in high-tech commercial markets. While they invest in processes and
equipment that produce other marketable processes and equipment, we invest in
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weapons systems that not only don't produce anything, but soak up additional
resources to man and maintain them. As if this weren't bad enough, the United
States keeps its best technical minds busy trying to figure out things like how to
make communications equipment function while nuclear bombs are going off
nearby, instead of figuring out how to apply new technology to mass consumer mar-
kets. For these reasons a shift of resources as outlined above will help the entire
national economy, including Connecticut's.
Converting the American Economy: The Economic Effects ofan Alternative Sec-
urity Policy, released by Michigan's Employment Research Associates (ERA), pro-
poses a four-year shift from military to domestic spending that starts with $35 billion
and ends with $104 billion, for an average of $70 billion a year. This is in the same
ballpark as proposals being debated in Congress, although some congressional
approaches involve a longer time frame. ERA recommends an alternative spending
pattern similar to that suggested in this article. The ERA proposal is illustrated in
Table 1.
The ERA estimated economic demand changes by sectors and ran its numbers
through the Multi-regional Forecast Simulation Model of the Regional Economic
Models, Inc. (REMI) of Amherst, Massachusetts. The results of the five-year shift
were a national net employment increase of 477,000 jobs. Twenty-four thousand jobs
were lost for every $1 billion cut from the military, and nearly 31,000 nonmilitary
jobs were created, a net gain of 6,800 jobs for each $1 billion transferred (see
Appendix A for breakdown by economic sector).
The ERA study includes good detailed discussions of an alternative military secu-
rity policy and corresponding military reductions and the need for new expenditures
in each of the alternative expenditure categories shown in Table 1.
Among others, three former U.S. secretaries of Defense, Jobs with Peace and a host
of other groups in a Common Agenda Coalition, and a substantial minority in Congress
have been advocating for several years that the military budget be halved from (in cur-
rent dollars) the $300 billion-a-year range to the $150 billion-a-year range by the year
2000. For the past several years (including FY '92), military spending has been declin-
ing a few billion dollars a year. The quick war against Iraq may end up causing a one-
time increase in military spending, but the consensus remains that military spending is
headed down for years to come. It might head down rapidly for a few years.
Table 1
New Program Funding, Fiscal Years 1991-1994
(in billions of current dollars)
Total
1991 1992 1993 1994 Average
Education $ 6.4 $10.9 $15.6 $ 19.5 $13.1
Infrastructure $ 5.1 $ 8.7 $12.4 $ 15.6 $10.5
Environment $ 2.4 $ 4.1 $ 5.9 $ 7.4 $ 5.0
Housing $ 5.4 $ 9.2 $13.1 $ 16.5 $11.1
Social Services $ 4.0 $ 6.8 $ 9.7 $ 12.1 $ 8.1
Health Care $ 4.5 $ 7.6 $10.9 $ 13.6 $ 9.2
Civilian R&D $ 4.2 $ 7.2 $10.2 $ 12.8 $ 8.6
Employment & Training $ 2.5 $ 4.2 $ 5.9 $ 7.4 $ 5.0
$34.6 $58.8 $83.7 $104.9
Annual Average New Spending $70.5
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Many constituencies have never entered the battle for the federal budget, because
they felt that it was an impossible battle to win and an arena inappropriate for their
small organizational resources. But suddenly it has become a winnable battle. If new
constituencies to this fight do not organize a national coalition quickly, however,
established lobbying associations will walk away with much of the peace dividend.
The Example of Affordable Housing
If we do see military spending decline to the levels the ex-secretaries of Defense and
the Common Agenda Coalition are calling for, it would not be unreasonable to see a
period of five or ten years when federal spending on affordable housing would com-
mand $25 billion a year more than it does now. That would be one sixth of the addi-
tional civilian spending made available each year by the shift of resources out of the
military to alternative activities, and the remaining five-sixths could be spent on the
other alternatives mentioned above.
What would a shift of $25 billion a year into affordable housing look like? When
Greater Boston Jobs with Peace took that question to Boston voters in 1987, the
response was two to one for a shift from the military. In response, the Boston Redevel-
opment Authority (BRA) in 1989 released From a Military to a Housing Buildup: The
Impact in Boston ofa Six Percent Shift in the Federal Budgetfrom the Military to Housing.
As shown in Table 2, the federal military budget in 1989 was $404 billion (48%
of your federal tax dollars), and the housing budget was nearly $8 billion. 6 Recent
increases have raised the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) budgets to the low $20 billions, but over a third of the more recent budgets
merely continues expiring rental assistance and does not indicate an increase in the
level of housing programs. In 1989, the $25 billion transfer represented a loss of
6 percent of military spending and a quadrupling of affordable housing spending.
Such a shift today would more than double affordable housing spending and would
nearly triple the actual level of housing services provided.
Table 2
Federal Spending on Housing and the Military, Fiscal Years 1981-1989
(in millions of dollars)
Budget Category FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY892
HUD 32,201 18,908 14,290 14,088 11,747 10,456 8,395 8,635 7,851
Military 210,160 247,559 276,302 305,778 344,371 370,927 378,964 392,772 404,176
Defense Function 157,513 185,309 209,903 227,413 252,748 273,375 281,999 290,361 298,255
Int'l Security
Assistance 5,095 5,416 6,613 7,924 9,391 10,499 7,106 4,500 2,823
National Aeronautics
and Space Adm.' — — 1,089 534 732 770 739 909 1,068
Military Portion of
Net Interest on
Public Debt 47,552 56,834 58,697 69,907 81,500 86,283 89,100 97,002 102,030
1. Military activities of NASA only.
2. HUD and military budgets estimated for FY 1989.
Sources: National Low Income Housing Information Service; Military Spending Research Services, Inc.
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Figure 1 shows how federal housing spending declined during the 1980s while mil-
itary spending increased. In real dollars, 1989 housing spending was less than one-
sixth what it was in 1979. Increases over the past two years plus an additional $25 bil-
lion shifted from military spending would still leave housing spending below 1979
levels in inflation-adjusted dollars.
The BRA study looked at current housing funds allocation formulas based on
population, percent living in poverty, and other indicators of need and concluded
that if the same allocation procedures were used, Boston's share of an additional
$25 billion a year nationally would provide $153 million a year more for housing
programs. This is well above the $60 million that Boston would receive if allocation
were based solely on population share. Other old, large New England cities would
experience allocations higher than their population share.
Figure 1
Military and HUD Spending, Fiscal Years 1981-1989,
















FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84
WD Spending
FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89
itary Spending1 h I Mi
Sources: National Low Income Housing Information Service; Military Spending Research Services, Inc.
This $153 million could be used by the public sector to leverage additional private
housing investment and generate about 2,300 new or substantially rehabilitated hous-
ing units per year, all of which would be affordable to low- or moderate-income
people, and is enough to meet Boston's housing needs. This BRA scenario is unreal-
istic, however, because public subsidy would never need to be so high ($67,000/unit
of housing). At most, public subsidy per unit would not have to exceed half that
amount. Private funds could be leveraged to finance the rest of the housing develop-
ment cost. That would leave half the funds to help low- and moderate-income people
pay rent; to purchase ownership shares and turn their housing into cooperatives or
reduce the monthly mortgage interest payments for new homeowners; to provide
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related job training, education, and counseling to support households in precarious
housing situations or those in transition from homelessness (see Appendix B).
Alternatively, as shown in the BRA study, $106 million per year of the funds could
supplement the rents of 68,000 low-income renter households in the city who now
pay rents in excess of 30 percent of their gross incomes. This would leave $47 mil-
lion, which could leverage additional private funds to generate 1,400 new or substan-
tially rehabilitated housing units per year.
This kind of housing is already being created in thousands of communities across
the United States. Typical development arrangements include establishment of proj-
ect specifications and objectives by public-private partnerships between a com-
munity and a nonprofit or for-profit developer, with support from additional
philanthropic or below-market-rate private financing. The community packages
local, state, and federal development subsidy funds into the project, and private
financing sources put up the majority of the total development cost.
The result is mixed-income rental housing with the poorest tenants receiving ongo-
ing rental assistance (part of the rent being paid with public funds); or cooperatives,
for which public funds pay the bulk of the cost for low-income tenants to purchase
ownership shares; or homeownership, for which public funds keep closing costs and
down payment low for the buyer, and pay part of the buyer's mortgage interest.
Currently, all New England states have federal Section 8 funds that provide
exactly this rental assistance service for some of their low-income households. Mas-
sachusetts has the 707 program, which is a mirror image of the federal Section 8 pro-
gram but uses state funds. The Massachusetts legislature has cut $33.5 million a year
in 707 rental assistance. If $25 billion a year for five or six years were shifted to hous-
ing and related programs, Massachusetts's share would be about $700 million a year.
The state would never have to think about cutting rental assistance.
The BRA study figured that a $25 billion shift from the military to housing would
bring an additional $375 million into the Greater Boston area extending out nearly
to Route 495 (the area included in the BRA's regional economic computer model).
Their model took into account the jobs that would be lost in the military sector,
including private manufacturing and research, and showed a 7,400 net increase in
jobs when all the funds were spent in housing development. The additional jobs
were in construction and the making, selling, and transporting of housing materials
from lumber to paint to refrigerators. The model also indicated that there would be
a net increase in regional personal income of $147 million a year.
Similar comparisons could be made regarding shifts in spending from the military
to the other areas suggested above: human services, economic infrastructure, pro-
grams to increase international economic competitiveness, and environmental pro-
tection and abatement. 7 Similar results would be obtained, showing net increases in
the quality of life, employment, and economic output.
This is not to say that some displaced workers in the military sector would not
suffer. Some of the shifted funds would, of course, be available to assist idled mili-
tary research and production facilities in adapting to the production of alternative
goods and services. Assistance would be available to subsidize conversion of closed
military bases to alternative uses. Resources would be available for retraining. Still,
some people and some urban areas would be hurt. The region as a whole, however,
would clearly benefit.
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Impact on Homelessness of the Shift of
Additional Resources
One way or another, all the institutions and advocacy groups involved in the issues
of homelessness, affordable housing, and human services are talking about the use
of public resources to improve the quality of life for the poorer portion of the popu-
lation. In our economic and political system, these public resources come mainly
from taxation of privately owned economic activities. Some public resources come
from the recycling of publicly expended dollars as those dollars turn over again and
again, rippling through the economy and generating jobs and income. But most
public resources come from the private sector. We can't have the level of public
resources that are necessary to meet human needs unless the private economy is
healthy and vigorous.
Homelessness will not be dealt with unless the U.S. government intervenes with
programs and tax breaks designed to make our economy more competitive interna-
tionally, and part of that is rebuilding economic infrastructure. Only a healthy econ-
omy can afford the public expenditures required to provide a decent quality of life
for all its citizens.
Shifting funds from the military to human services and housing might help a lot of
people in the short to medium term, but such high spending could not be sustained
for long unless the vigor of the overall economy is improved. So in the long run it is
just as important for homeless people that military funds be shifted to activities
specifically designed to improve the economy as it is for funds to be shifted to pro-
grams that directly benefit them.
Even with a shift of funds to programs that directly benefit homeless people, there
is a trade-off between meeting immediate and midterm need. If all the funds that have
gone into shelters and hotels for the homeless had gone into transitional housing pro-
grams with related job training, education, and counseling programs, there would be
far fewer homeless people today. Of course, the immediate needs of the homeless
must be addressed as well. Nonetheless, more of the scarce resources available over
the past decade should have been spent on transitional programs than was the case.
Certainly when we contemplate an alternative federal spending pattern that better
meets the needs of our society and the world, we want to maximize the mainstream-
ing of homeless and near homeless people, not increase their warehousing in shel-
ters or hotels.
More funds for housing can increase the availability of affordable single-room-
occupancy (SRO) housing; group transitional housing facilities with supportive
training, education, and services; housing for homeless people with special needs
such as mental health or retardation problems, with related supportive services; and
more affordable conventional family housing. All these programs exist in most of
New England, and they should be expanded with a small share of the resources that
must be shifted from military spending. But we must also insist that funds be shifted
from the military to programs that improve the economy. One does no good in the
end without the other. Without the latter, the transition from homelessness to a self-
sustaining life of good quality will never happen, because the sustaining employ-
ment won't be there.
107
New England Journal ofPublic Policy
Impact of the Shift on Massachusetts
Military Taxes andJobs
New England taxpayers send over half their city, state, and federal tax dollars to the
federal government. They send four to five times as many dollars to the federal gov-
ernment as they do to state government. The federal government uses 48 percent of
its tax dollars on the military, mostly to fund the Department of Defense's (DOD)
operations, research and development, and weapons procurement. But some mili-
tary funding goes to the Department of Energy's (DOE) nuclear weapons produc-
tion, to the military component of NASA, and to pay the military's share of the
national debt.
Over the past decade the federal government reduced the share of federal spend-
ing for nonmilitary purposes and transferred every dollar taken from those programs
to the increased military budgets of the decade. The greatest reduction was in hous-
ing and community development programs. Those transfers paid for most, but not
quite all, the decade-long military buildup. The rest was paid for by borrowing
money— by the deficit. But even so, most of the deficit could have been avoided if
tax reductions for the wealthy had not been enacted by the Reagan administration
and Congress.
There are no exact measures for direct or indirect military employment. Jobs with
Peace estimates that Massachusetts military employment peaked in 1988-1989 and
has subsequently declined by about 2 percent. There are about 120,000 direct and
indirect military jobs in the state, comprising 4 percent of the state work force. 8
Direct employees are civilians in private firms doing work under military contracts
or military personnel or civilians directly employed by the DOD. Indirect employ-
ment includes suppliers of goods and services to these private military contractors
and DOD facilities. Examples are sheet metal or office supply producers who sell to
military contractors, subcontractors, or military bases.
Massachusetts Direct and Indirect Military Employment
Jobs Jobs
Direct Indirect Total
DOD R and D and procurement in private firms 59,000 30,000 89,000
DOD civilian and military employees 21,000 10,000 31,000
Totals 80,000 40,000 120,000
Anticipated reductions in military spending could occur in three areas:
operations/force levels, research and development, and procurement/production of
military hardware. Massachusetts has relatively small forces based in the state, but
its largest facility, Fort Devens, is slated to be closed and converted to civilian uses.
Since Massachusetts has the highest proportion of its defense contracting awards
in research and development among all the states, and since R and D is not
expected to be cut appreciably, the state should continue to do well in that area.
Reductions in missile, radar, and jet engine procurement, however, will cost the
state several thousand jobs over the coming decade.
Massachusetts gets less than its population share of military spending in opera-
tions— the largest category— because its per capita receipt of military base dollars
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is below average. There are approximately 21,000 direct DOD uniformed and civil-
ian employees in Massachusetts, and about 10,000 indirect jobs generated by this
direct employment. In the spring of 1991, DOD announced that Fort Devens would
be closed, and the decision has subsequently become final. Congress had decided in
1988 to expand the base with a new mission. That decision, which had the force of
law, has been reversed. The Devens closing may eliminate up to 9,000 of the state's
21,000 direct DOD employee jobs and 4,000 of the 10,000 indirect jobs that the
direct jobs generate.
Massachusetts gets more than its share of R and D and procurement dollars
and is one of the nation's leading military contracting states. Virtually none of
these military contracting dollars goes to companies or universities in Boston. The
bulk of it goes to firms and schools in the area between Route 128 and Route 495.
Worcester is strong in airframe forgings and aircraft and missile ceramics. Western
Massachusetts has missile guidance and a variety of subcontracting, largely from
Connecticut military contractors. But these areas are less dependent on military
employment than the Routes 128-495 belt. Boston itself has virtually no direct and
little indirect military employment. The city's economy has benefited to some extent
from the general level of economic activity that military employment has brought to
the eastern Massachusetts region.
Military Employment in Perspective
Let us place military employment in proper perspective. For many years the printing
and publishing industry in Massachusetts employed about as many people as mili-
tary R and D and production. Even after the recent decline in the minicomputer
industry, computer hardware and software for civilian markets employ more than
military R and D and production, and public and private employment in education
is four to five times greater.
Massachusetts lost 125,000 jobs in 1990 (4.1%) from all employment sectors com-
bined, more than the combined total of all direct and indirect military employment,
of which only 1,000 or 2,000 were military. That loss, the sharpest one-year percent-
age drop since such records have been kept, exceeds the 1.1 percent and 3.4 percent
losses in the 1982 and 1974 recessions, respectively. New England's 1990 loss from
all employment sectors was 250,000 jobs, about the same number as the total direct
and indirect New England military employment. 9
The point is that Massachusetts in particular, and New England in general, are
highly diversified, high-tech-oriented economies in which military jobs play an
important, but quite minor role. Over 20,000 jobs have been lost in the Mas-
sachusetts minicomputer industry over the past three years because personal com-
puters, largely made elsewhere, have been expanding in power and eating into the
Massachusetts share from the bottom of the market.
Even if the DOD budget is cut in half— in inflation-adjusted dollars— over the
next decade, most of the reduction in Massachusetts will be in operations, followed by
procurement, and least in R and D. The resultant loss in direct military employment
wouldn't necessarily exceed the loss in minicomputer jobs in the past three years. The
problem is how to keep the regional economy competitive as a generator of new, high
value-added high-tech industry and professional services. If this is accomplished, any
reasonable alternative federal spending pattern will benefit the region.
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Current federal budget priorities mean that Boston residents who could be
employed in expanding high-tech commercial businesses remain unemployed or
underemployed in lower-paying service jobs. Current federal budget priorities result
in forgone economic opportunities— economic opportunity costs— to the entire
state of Massachusetts that would easily generate more jobs and income than the jobs
and income which would be lost by a substantial shift of military to civilian spending.
The net impacts of a shift of federal resources can be estimated with any degree of
probable accuracy only if specifics are used— a specific amount of dollars per year
from each of the three military spending categories to a specific amount into each of
the alternative categories of civilian production. A detailed example is beyond the
scope of this article, but if, say, $35 billion a year from current levels of military
spending— taken two-thirds from operations and one-third from production—
were shifted into a spending pattern that in some way equally distributes the money
among the alternative categories suggested, it is safe to surmise that such a transfer
would, on balance, result in at least some net economic benefit to the state in terms
of employment, income, and economic output. Depending on the specifics, the net
benefit could be quite substantial.
Conversion ofFort Devens to Alternative Use
The Fort Devens closing may eliminate up to 9,000 of the state's 21,000 direct DOD
employee jobs (43%), and 4,000 of the 10,000 indirect jobs (40%) they generate.
Direct and indirect jobs generated by Fort Devens economic activity total 14,000,
nearly 12 percent of the Massachusetts total, which includes research arid production
employees at private firms. The Ayer Chamber of Commerce breaks down the 9,000
direct employment estimate at 5,200 military and 3,800 civilian DOD employees.
It looks as though the base will be converted to non-DOD use with a significant
minor share of the land remaining with the army for a testing/training ground, or
that the entire base will be converted to non-DOD uses. It is one of three sites in
the state being studied for the state's second-largest civil airport. The history of eco-
nomic conversion of military bases indicates that even if the base is closed, alterna-
tive uses will generate significant employment. While the range of possibilities is
large, it is quite reasonable to anticipate that reuse would generate three quarters of
former employment levels within a decade. Local examples of military base reuse
are the South Boston Army Base, converted into a marine industrial park, and the
Charlestown Navy Yard, converted into housing, office, tourism, and retail uses. 10
As the base is phased out and alternate uses begin to come in, there will still prob-
ably be a temporary dip for a few years where there might be only four or five thou-
sand direct and indirect jobs generated by activity at the site. Over the course of the
next decade, there are likely to be reductions in military and civilian employment at
other military bases in the state. The air force announced at the end of May 1991
that it will reduce employment at its Hanscom Field Electronic Systems Division by
10 percent. The Weymouth Naval Air Station will be cutting a small number of jobs.
These are relatively small losses in jobs, but typical of the kinds of reductions we
may see a little more in the next few years.
The 9,000 Devens jobs equal about 40 percent of those which have been lost in
Massachusetts mini- and mainframe computer manufacturing firms in the past four
years. It helps to maintain perspective by reminding ourselves of such facts as: Mas-
sachusetts private universities and K-12 public education facilities each employ
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about 100,000. Public colleges and private K-12 institutions employ roughly another
100,000. These 300,000 direct education jobs in turn generate about 100,000 indirect
ones. The loss of Devens is a terrible blow, but there is a lot going on in Massachu-
setts, and there are a lot of jobs— close to 3 million of them.
Unfortunately, redevelopment of Devens in a weak regional economy is bound to
be slow. The uncertainty of whether all or only part of the land is going to be
released by the army makes the job harder. If the army retains part of the vast
acreage to use as a mortar firing range, it would lower the value of surrounding land.
Even more troubling is the extensive toxic pollution in scattered sites around the
base. It is the army's responsibility to do the cleanup. Until cleanup is under way and
there is certainty about its timely completion, alternate use development cannot pro-
ceed very far. It is incumbent upon all organizations in the state committed to influ-
encing the issues discussed in this article to assist the Fort Devens redevelopment
effort in putting pressure on the army to reach a final decision on the land use and
to undertake significant cleanup quickly.
As for thirty years, there are federal programs to assist military base conversions.
At the state level, Massachusetts created the Massachusetts Government Land Bank
in 1975 to help finance military base conversions and other community development
activity. The Land Bank, which had success with those conversions, currently has $20
million in loan funds available, much of which could help finance Devens projects.
The Land Bank will provide expertise and a guiding hand as well as money. Gover-
nor William Weld has established an advisory commission for Fort Devens conver-
sion, and area communities and institutions have formed a redevelopment coalition.
The project will be a tough one in the short run, but will probably work out all
right in the long run. In a study that understated difficulties and long time frames,
the DOD Office of Economic Adjustment did a 1986 survey of 97 closed military
bases that employed 93,000 civilians. After conversion to non-DOD use, they
employed 158,000 civilians. As with the Boston Army Base, 75 include industrial
parks, 42 have municipal airports, and many have schools.
State Activityfor Alternate Use
State governments and other public and private institutions at the regional and local
level can initiate steps to ameliorate the negative impact of military cuts and
enhance the positive impact of alternative federal spending. Regions should under-
take activities that will attract public and private dollars which are no longer claimed
by military activities. The Land Bank, a perfect example, reduces the negative
impacts of base closings by helping to plan and finance reuse.
The Bank of Boston's Economics Department released its "Survey of New Eng-
land Defense Contractors" in 1990. The 355 respondents were predominantly small
and well-established firms, three quarters of which were manufacturers and the
remainder largely service providers. Eighty percent had sales of $25 million or less.
Defense contracts account for over 40 percent of sales, on average. When asked
which type of government support they preferred to help them adapt to reduced
military contracts— grants, loans, export assistance, or worker training— 56 per-
cent of the respondents picked export assistance, grants and loans each received
about 25 percent, and worker training 20 percent. Overseas markets accounted for a
significant chunk of the firms' sales, especially in Massachusetts, where foreign sales
are 25 percent of total sales. Not only are foreign sales strong, but the firms think
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foreign sales are a key to growth. Export controls and lack of depth in export experi-
ence are limitations.
Redirected federal dollars could respond to this need and export controls could
be further relaxed. But states don't have to wait for the federal government to
respond. State resources could be directed to help these firms develop export mar-
kets, which in turn would demonstrate the profitability of New England high-tech
export-oriented business and attract further investment into the region.
A Winning Strategy
The savings and loan bailout could cost the taxpayers between $200 billion and $600
billion from its beginning in 1989 and continuing for a generation. 11 If we paid more
of the bailout cost over the next few years, rather than stretching it out, we could cut
the $600 billion in half. Congressman Joseph Kennedy's bill, which has made it out of
committee in the House, proposes this correct pay-now approach. If Kennedy's bill
were to be adopted, and if the Congress and the judicial system went after perpetra-
tors of fraud in the S and L industry, the cost could be further reduced, by recovering
some of the funds, to no more than $200 billion. If advocates of alternative spending
patterns direct all their energy toward dealing with municipal and state fiscal crises
and never focus on the federal budget, the cost of the bailout will be closer to $600
billion than $200 billion. It is partly up to us whether money freed by reduced military
spending goes to waste in this bailout or to humanizing and economically productive
uses that will strengthen the economy and improve the quality of life.
The deficit is the military budget. As previously noted, the 1980s saw every federal
dollar cut from nonmilitary programs transferred to the military. In addition, federal
taxes on the wealthy were reduced. The combined effect caused the deficit to multi-
ply astronomically. The most efficient and painless way to reduce the deficit is to
improve the productivity, innovation, and competitiveness of the economy. This will
increase public revenues sufficiently to maintain adequate spending levels and
reduce the deficit. If more tax dollars had been used in the 1980s for economic
infrastructure, education, and other programs and incentives to improve the econ-
omy, we wouldn't have the deficit problem today. Again, the choice is partly ours, to
the extent that we educate ourselves about what is necessary to improve the econ-
omy and be advocates for it, so we can get what we want.
The winning strategy fuses the energies of constituencies that want to reduce mili-
tary spending; human services, housing, education, and environmental constituen-
cies that want to maintain or strengthen public expenditures and laws; and business,
labor, and policy groups who understand that a healthy, competitive, profitable, and
relatively full employment economy can be attained only if federal resources are
shifted toward economic infrastructure, education, and programs and incentives to
increase economic competitiveness.
Human services, housing, and environmental groups must develop and demon-
strate an understanding of the economic realities that make their demands realistic
and sustainable. They must not just be advocates for their constituents' immediate
requirements, but must also advocate public spending that will improve the econ-
omy and make their humanizing demands sustainable.
Business, labor, and policy groups who have restricted their advocacy to narrow
economic issues must respond to the new economic sophistication of the human ser-
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vice organizations, and realize the wisdom of forming an alliance with them. These
progressive business groups must add arguments for the quality of life to their
narrow economic perspective. Peace and disarmament groups must recognize that
their objectives can best be accomplished by demonstrating to the human services
and business groups that the resources needed to accomplish their objectives can
largely be found in the military budget.
Peace constituencies must spend much more time doing this and much less point-
ing out what is wrong with persistently high military spending in terms of destructive
foreign policy and the threat of nuclear war. Only with this more sophisticated
understanding and strategy can these three constituency groupings achieve their
respective objectives— together.^
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Appendix A
Occupational Employment Impacts of Alternative Priorities
(Average Annual 1991-1994)
Jobs Gained
Jobs Lost from Civilian Net Jobs
from Military Spending Gained or
Net Gain Occupations Spending Cuts Increases Lost
Managerial & Management Related Occupations
-1,300 +7,850Educational administrators +6,550
Financial managers -7,190 + 18,120 + 10,930
Public administrators + 1,240 + 1,240
Purchasing managers -2,230 +3,120 +890
NEC* other managers -62,400 + 107,370 +44,970
Accountants & auditors -14,670 + 25,980 + 11,310
Inspectors, management -3,320 +3,650 +330
Insurance claims examiners -220 +400 + 180
Wholesale & retail buyers -1,240 + 1,860 +620
NEC other management support -31,240 +42,030 + 10,790
Engineering Occupations
Chemical engineers -990 + 1,620 +630
Civil engineers -3,120 +9,740 +6,620
Electrical & electronic engineers -12,770 + 13,220 +450
Mechanical engineers -6,910 +8,000 + 1,090
Mining petro engineers -330 +790 +460
Architects -1,080 +3,230 +2,150
Surveyors -1,640 +3,470 + 1,830
Computer, Natural, Mathematical & Social Scientists
-7,620 + 12,220Computer systems analysts +4,600
Natural scientists -6,750 +9,560 +2,810
Math scientists -1,920 + 2,960 + 1,040
Social scientists -2,040 +4,120 +2,080
Social, Educational, & Religious Workers; Lawyers &
Judicial Workers
-3,330 +32,510Clergy & religious directors + 29,180
Social & recreation workers -3,940 +34,620 +30,680
Lawyers & judicial workers -6,150 + 14,330 +8,180
Pre-K, K-6 teachers -8,730 +81,970 +73,240
7-12 teachers -4,740 +44,010 +39,270
Postsecondary education teachers -2,940 + 11,230 +8,290
NEC teachers, counselors, instructors -7,690 +44,290 +36,600
Librarians -1,120 +4,640 +3,520
Health Diagnosing & Treating Occupations
-5,870 + 13,370Physicians & dentists +7,500
Nurses, dieticians, therapists -11,790 +38,110 +26,320
Writers, Artists, & Entertainers
-3,370 +4,980Reporters & writers + 1,610
Public relations -1,120 +3,410 + 2,290
NEC writers & artists -6,600 + 14,360 +7,760
Technicians
-11,260 +35,640Health technicians + 24,380
Drafters -5,620 +9,910 +4,290
Physical & life science technicians -3,650 +3,980 +330




Jobs Lost from Civilian Net Jobs
from Military Spending Gained or
Spending Cuts Increases Lost
Marketing & Sales Occupations
Real estate agents & brokers
Securities & financial sales workers
NEC marketing & sales workers














Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing & Related Occupations
Agricultural supervisors
Animal caretakers
Farm managers, operators & workers
Fishers, hunters, trappers





NEC construction trade workers
Extractive workers
Mechanics, Installers, & Repairers
Communications equipment workers
Electric, & electronic equipment workers
Machinery workers
Vehicle equipment workers







Machine Setters, Operators, Tenders; Assemblers;





Plant & system occupations
-2,720 +5,060 + 2,340
-1,130 + 1,740 +610
-85,610 + 138,210 + 52,600
-6,510 + 10,220 +3,710
-10,780 + 16,020 + 5,240
191,990 + 253,820 +61,830





-4,730 +7,150 + 2,420
-17,790 +42,750 +24,960
-6,500 + 13,790 +7,290
-300 +490 + 190
-5,150 + 15,050 +9,900
-3,470 + 10,210 +6,740
-140 +430 +290
-1,380 +2,070 +690
-1,110 + 1,780 +670
-23,970 +34,610 +10,640
-6,410 + 19,060 + 12,650
22,800 + 101,840 +79,040
-2,350 +4,650 + 2,300
-1,170 + 1,390 +220
-8,270 +8,840 +570
19,230 +30,560 + 11,330
15,500 + 19,540 +4,040
11,440 + 17,970 +6,530
-1,720 + 2,630 +910
-890 +2,020 + 1,130
-1,830 +2,520 +690




-1,340 +2,700 + 1,360
18,870 + 22,440 +3,570
-2,540 +4,390 + 1,850
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Net Gain Occupations
Jobs Gained
Jobs Lost from Civilian Net Jobs
from Military Spending Gained or
Spending Cuts Increases Lost












Aero & astronautical engineers
Industrial engineers
Metallurgists






Machine Setters, Operators, Tenders; Assemblers
Numerical control machine operators
Combination machine tool operators
Metal & plastic machine operators
Assemblers
Transportation & Material Moving Machine &
Vehicle Operators
Pilots & flight engineers
Water transport workers
Uniformed Military Personnel
-4,170 + 1,230 -2,940
-3,700 +3,180 -520





























by $70 billion a year transfer from military to domestic spending
+477,000
Source: Converting the American Economy, Employment Research Associates, Lansing, Michigan.
*NEC = not elsewhere counted
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Appendix B
The Rent Gap: Boston Tenant Rent Payments over
30 Percent of Income, 1988 1
Actual % of Renter No. of
Average Households Renter Units Per Per
Household Monthly Rent Monthly in Income in Income Household, Household Total Gap,
Income 2 Affordable 3 Rent4 Range5 Range6 Gap, Monthly' Gap, 1988 19888
$10,000 $125 $373 22% 27,170 $248 $2,976 $80,857,920
$10,000-24,999 $438 $489 33% 40,755 $52 $618 $25,186,590
$25,000-39,999 $813 $514 20% 24,700 $0 $0 $0
$40,000+ $1,500 $700 25% 30,875 $0 $0 $0
Total 100% 123,500 $106,044,510
1. Non-Boston Housing Authority tenants.
2. From BRA 1985 Household Survey; trended to 1988 using wage data from Bureau of Labor Statistics.
3. Assuming each household pays 30 percent of its income toward rent.
4. From BRA 1985 Household Survey; trended to 1988 using rent data from survey of Boston G/o6e-advertised
rents by Michael Stone, University of Massachusetts at Boston.
5. From BRA 1985 Household Survey.
6. Total number of 1988 rental units estimated using data presented in Rolf Goetze, Boston's Housing Stock
1970-2000 (BRA, December 1987).
7. Actual rent minus affordable rent.
8. Annual gap times number of households.























Housing unit price affordable to family6
Construction cost7
Per-unit subsidy needed
1. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
2. Assuming family spends 30 percent of its income on housing.
3. Mortgage amount times 0.0034.
4. Construction cost times 0.01077.
5. Mortgage amount times 0.004166.
6. Assuming a 10 percent down payment and a thirty-year mortgage with a 10 percent interest rate.
7. Assuming no land costs.
Source: From a Military to a Housing Buildup: The Impact in Boston of a Six Percent Shift in the Federal
Budget from the Military to Housing, Boston Redevelopment Authority, August 1989.
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Appendix C
Critique of Typical Approach to Military Economic
Analysis for New England
Dartmouth's Richard Barf contributed the piece on New England, "Living by the
Sword and Dying by the Sword? Defense Spending and New England's Economy in
Retrospect and Prospect," in The Pentagon and the Cities (Andrew Kirby, ed., Urban
Affairs Annual Review 40 [Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1992]). Typical of most articles
on military economics in New England that have appeared within the past decade, this
one overstates the military dependence of the regional economy, creates the impres-
sion that "defense-related" industries do more military work than is the case, fails to
point out the economic benefits to the region of a shift of military spending to alterna-
tive uses, and fails to state clearly the overarching nonmilitary strengths of the regional
economy. While useful in many respects, such articles do a disservice by exaggerating
the negative impact of military cutbacks and understating the positive impact of alter-
native federal spending patterns.
In "Living by the Sword," Barf says, for example, that military prime contract
awards (for research and production) to businesses accounted for more than 7 per-
cent of Massachusetts gross state product (GSP) in 1984. This implies that direct
employment on military contract work accounted for 7 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP). No study has ever shown that direct military contracting employment
approached anywhere near this amount.
Defense-related industry, which produces primarily for civilian markets, approaches
7 percent of Massachusetts GDP, but the military component of defense-related output is a
minor share of that 7 percent. "Direct" and "indirect" military employment was esti-
mated by Data Resources, Inc. (DRI), at nearly 7 percent, but at least one third of that is
indirect economic activity — sales by suppliers of sheet metal, stationery, wire, paper
clips, construction services, and so forth, to military contracting firms. Furthermore,
the DRI figure included not just private military contracting, but also military bases.
Jobs with Peace estimated direct and indirect military output, including military bases
as well as private military contracting, at 5 percent of Massachusetts GDP
Barf says (page 92) that the "defense share of total private employment (in Connecti-
cut) exceeds 9 percent." This implies that all 9 percent are in defense work. He acci-
dentally corrects himself on the next page by stating it correctly as defense-related,
and not as defense, as he had done on the previous page. To qualify as a defense-
related industry, at least 10 percent of the employees in the industry must be working
on military projects. Thus the two statements I have cited above represent estimates
that could be as much as 90 percent different from one another, depending on whether
"defense" or "defense-related" is the criterion.
Barf briefly explains at the beginning of the article that defense-related means that at
least 10 percent of employees are working on military projects. He never mentions this
again in the article, which is entirely based on defense-related, not defense, job and
output data. The way he uses the figures, plus these two clear misstatements, give the
lay reader the impression that defense-related essentially means "defense." This is
also true of most articles on the subject of military economics in New England over at
least the past decade.
The implicit overstatement of military employment/output is magnified in Barf's
article by the dearth of meaningful discussion about nonmilitary strengths of the New
England economy and his concluding statement that "in the context of the present
regional recession outside of defense-related industry, the prognosis for the regional
economy for the next decade is not bright."
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Barf's misrepresentation is nicely put in the title, "Living by the Sword and Dying
by the Sword?" Barf overstates the defense component of the New England regional
boom of the late 1970s and early 1980s and the contraction in defense work as a cause
of the regional recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s.
He points out that between 1977 and 1984, New England defense-related industry
grew 12.7 percent, four times faster than in the nation as a whole. He adds that mili-
tary prime contract awards for research and development (R and D) and production
increased 180 percent in real terms in New England between 1977 and 1984, the high-
est per capita increase in the nation. Further, Barf cites Lynne Brown, the Federal
Reserve Bank's economist, who states that during this period New England was the
most defense-oriented census region in the United States, with Connecticut the most
defense-oriented state in the nation, New Hampshire the third, and Massachusetts
the sixth.
Aside from citing Brown's observation that Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Vermont, and Connecticut also had very strong civilian components in their defense-
related industries, Barf glosses over the nondefense component of defense-related
industries. Again, this is typical of the entire literature. My own estimate is that 15 per-
cent of defense-related industry employment in Massachusetts was military at the
military employment peak in the mid-to-late 1980s.
Comparing 25,000 jobs lost in the past five years in the nondefense-related com-
puter hardware industry with about 3,000 lost in military industry illustrates that the
regional recession through 1990 had little or nothing to do with military spending cut-
backs: I estimate, based on statements of many leading Massachusetts computer
firms, that 4 percent of computer hardware and software production in Massachusetts
is military, and 96 percent is for the civilian market. Hence, information/data processing
systems is not a "defense-related" industry.
In Massachusetts, where the vast majority of New England's computer industry is
located, roughly 25,000 computer hardware production jobs (my estimate) have been
lost in the past five years. These jobs represent 44 percent of total direct defense
employment in the mid-1980s, according to Jobs with Peace's Massachusetts and Its
Military Industry (1986). Data Resources, Inc., which estimates military employment as
a bit higher than Jobs with Peace does, would place 25,000 lost computer industry
jobs as about one third of the total commonwealth direct military employment in the
mid-1980s. Over the same five-year period when those computer hardware jobs were
lost, I have heard of about 3,000 military industry jobs being cut.
Barf cites Harrison and Kluver's statement that a slowdown in the rate of growth
of defense spending probably contributed to New England's poor job performance
related to the nation as a whole in the late 1 980s. Barf also notes that from 1 984 to
1987, New England lost 8,400 defense-related jobs. Note that this tells us absolutely
nothing about how many of these jobs were actually defense jobs. During the same
period, 100,000 manufacturing jobs were lost. Again, the layman gets the impression
that military cutbacks contributed significantly to the regional recession, when the
numbers actually state the opposite. At the most, a minority of the 8,400 defense-
related jobs were actually defense jobs, of a total of 100,000 jobs.
Prime contract awards (R and D and production awards of $25,000 or greater) to
R and D, engineering, and manufacturing entities peaked in New England in 1986, but
remained near the peak for two more years. The funds represented in prime contract
awards are expended in most cases over one to three years following the award.
Hence, actual defense R and D and production economic activity did not begin to
decline meaningfully in New England until 1990 at the earliest.
The regional recession that began in 1988 and may bottom out in the first half of
1992 was caused almost entirely by contraction in real estate and related construction,
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finance and insurance, mini- and mainframe computer hardware, and the regional
impact of the national recession. Military industry, in fact, continued to bolster the
regional economy during this period.
To be sure, as Barf concludes, the regional economy is currently weak and in
recession, and any substantial defense downturn will certainly make problems worse.
The regional recession we have seen to date, however, has not been caused at all
significantly by military cutbacks.
Military cuts will soon begin to take their toll, however. While New England had rel-
atively low per capita annual military base expenditures, much of what it had is pack-
ing up and leaving. The supposedly nonpolitical base closings that were announced
are hitting Democratic districts far harder than Republican ones. Pease Air Force
Base in New Hampshire is closing. Fort Devens, Massachusetts's largest base, will be
phased out over the next two years. Maine's Loring Air Force Strategic Air Command
(SAC) B-52 bomber base will be closed soon. In addition, there will be a lower level of
military contracting in jet engines, avionics (airplane control systems), air-to-air mis-
siles, radar, and nuclear missile guidance and control for at least a decade.
The main impact of military R and D and production on the New England economy
has always come from the R and D component, not from the direct, or even indirect,
employment benefits, but rather from the spin-off of civilian industry and the general
contribution to the high-tech resource base. The Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy-centered R and D made New England a leader in the following civilian businesses:
computer hardware and software, jet engines, avionics, airframe structural members,
radar, missile guidance and control, communications equipment, high temperature
ceramics, lasers, and other high-tech enterprises. In large part because of military
R and D, the region in general, and Massachusetts in particular, has become good at
starting new high-tech businesses and nurturing them through to the beginnings of
maturity, at which point they often leave New England in search of cheaper labor or
location in market centers.
So the key impact of the ongoing shift of federal spending out of military production
does not have to do with military cutbacks, but with the alternative federal expenditure
pattern that is simultaneously emerging. Military R and D is not expected to be cut as
much as other military spending categories, and Massachusetts gets the highest per
capita share in the nation. So even the cuts bode better for Massachusetts than for
other military-dependent states.
So far the region has been hurt more by the emerging federal spending pattern than
by military cutbacks. The savings and loan bailout has captured just about all the funds
that have been shifted out of military spending to date. Very little of that money goes
to New England; it basically goes to the South and West.
The issue is how we can influence the alternative spending pattern to help New






During World War II, 50,000 people worked in the 130-acre Charlestown Navy Yard
cranking out small submarines and destroyers. Most of these were mothballed
immediately after the war, and the yard became a maintenance and repair facility.
Gradually this work became a backwater operation for the navy, but the preoccupa-
tions of the Cold War led the navy to maintain the facility. When the decision to close
the base in 1974 was finally made, about 400 still toiled on ship maintenance or
keeping up yard facilities.
It took four years for the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA), a quasi-public
entity, to acquire 105 acres in 1978. Since then, 19 buildings have been rehabilitated
with the assistance of $470 million in private investment, making this the largest
preservation and reuse effort in the United States. In addition, three new construction
developments added 302 housing units. In total, there is now:





Total 3,032,000 gross square feet
Massachusetts General Hospital occupies nearly all the medical research space,
but a biomedical firm is also a tenant. The Massachusetts Water Resources Authority
has much of the office space, and some BRA offices are located there. There are 614
rental housing units in rehabilitated structures, and 320 new construction condo-
minium units. One hundred seventy-one of the 934 housing units are occupied by
low- and moderate-income households — gross incomes at or below 50 percent or
80 percent, respectively, of the metropolitan area median income. Along the way this
development provided 2,000 construction jobs, 2,800 permanent jobs, and annual
property tax revenues of $4 million; $67 million in construction paychecks and an
annual $89 million in paychecks to permanent workers ripple through the regional
economy, creating employment.
With the exception of the housing developments that include low- or moderate-
income units, the redevelopment of the yard took place essentially under market
conditions, that is, without public subsidies. Many of the rehabilitated structures were
historic and the land under them remains in BRA ownership under eighty-year ground
leases. Outside of the historic district the ownership has been transferred to the devel-
opers. Aside from the affordable housing components, public subsidy was confined to
parking, utilities, street improvements, Harbor Park surface features, and landscaping.
For example, some surface park improvements, landscaping, and utilities were
funded by:
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) $ 761,000
Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management 560,439
Boston Capital Loan Order 795,256
Boston Redevelopment Authority 346,247
Total public funds for park improvements $2,462,942
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Much of this public money will be repaid to the city and be reused for other affordable
housing and community economic development activities.
The $7 million conversion of Building 103 into elderly apartments was subsidized
by a HUD Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) for $1.6 million. Through state tax-
exempt bonds, the quasi-public Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) put in
$3.5 million in construction and permanent financing at 1.5 percent to 2 percent below
market-rate interest (possible because of the tax-exempt bond status). The state Exec-
utive Office of Communities and Development (EOCD) is paying out an operating
SHARP (State Housing Assistance for Rental Production) over a period of fifteen years.
In return for SHARP assistance, 25 percent of the units will remain occupied by low-
income tenants who will also receive state 707 rental assistance. All the other units
were leased at rents affordable to moderate-income households.
Fifty new construction condominium units were developed for moderate-income
homebuyers. MHFA provided below-market-rate financing to the condo buyers. The
city of Boston provided an additional subsidy of about $21,000 per unit for ten units,
which enabled households with gross incomes at or below 80 percent of the
metropolitan area median income to purchase them.
In addition to the $470 million of private investment that financed nearly all the Navy
Yard development, ground lease and other revenue to the Boston Redevelopment
Authority will continue to provide a resource for further community economic devel-
opment activity in Boston.
The growth climate in the Massachusetts economy during 1978 to 1986, when all
the completed development deals were put together, aided the public sector managers
of the base conversion in obtaining the necessary private investment. Space is still
available for substantial additional development in the yard. The conversion includes
22 acres of open space (park, pedestrian mall, harbor walk), a sailing center and
marina, two day-care centers, and retail shops.
Source: BRA's Master Plan for the Navy Yard; my experience as a fiscal manager for the city's
UDAG grants and other federal funds; conversations with BRA program managers.
South Boston Naval Annex and South Boston Army Base
Long unused holdovers from the Cold War, these two facilities were closed in the
mid-1970s and mid-1980s. Their conversion, as with the Charlestown Naval Shipyard,
was a boon to the area, because facilities that were employing few and producing little
became economic engines for the regional economy. The conversion of these two
bases resulted in $140 million in private investment by tenants for capital improve-
ments to leased space, and the presence of 150 companies and 3,500 jobs.
In April 1973, the Department of Defense announced the closing or curtailment
of forty military bases across the nation. Five were in Massachusetts, including the
Charlestown Naval Shipyard and the South Boston Naval Annex. Reuse was facilitated
in 1973 with the award of a key $420,000 from the federal Economic Development
Administration (EDA) to plan for the conversion of both bases. Within a month follow-
ing the announcement of the closing plans, the state had established the Joint Com-
mission on Federal Base Conversion, which recommended establishment of the
Massachusetts Government Land Bank (MGLB).
The MGLB was to use state general obligation bonds to help acquire and convert
closed base facilities and provide technical assistance to impacted communities and
development entities. The MGLB was quickly established and given authority to do
up to $40 million in financing. In 1987 it acquired the South Boston Naval Annex for
$4.9 million and simultaneously transferred it to the Boston Economic Development
and Industrial Corporation (EDIC). Subsequently, the federal General Services Admin-
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istration (GSA) returned $1.6 million. The MGLB acquisition was done on a forty-year
permanent financing basis, so that EDIC is paying off the Land Bank mortgage over
that period.
The EDIC is a private nonprofit industrial and commercial development and operat-
ing entity created by the city of Boston, with a city-appointed board (a quasi-public
organization, similar in this regard to the Boston Redevelopment Authority). Formed in
1971, its major activity has been the conversion of the Naval Annex and the adjacent
South Boston Army Base to the Boston Marine Industrial Park (BMIP). The Naval Annex
(167 acres) and the Army Base (24 acres) together left EDIC with 191 acres and 32
buildings containing 3,028,000 square feet to convert to civilian use.
The Army Base was acquired much later, in 1985, with $1.3 million of tax-exempt
industrial development bond funds and a federal Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) $2.2 million Section 108 loan. The financing for both bases was
at below-market interest rates.
Funding sources for the Naval Annex redevelopment, in addition to the Land Bank,
included the federal Economic Development Administration, the state Coastal Zone
Management, city of Boston general obligation bonds, and private investment. By
1980 the Naval Annex portion had fourteen tenants employing 1,500 people.
Another quasi-public agency, the Massachusetts Port Authority, leases 47 acres —
nearly a third of the Naval Annex portion — for shipping terminal and auto import stor-
age purposes. It included two warehouses, a cement off-loading facility, and the Black
Falcon cruise terminal, as well as EDIC's Boston Technical Center (BTC), which offers
twenty- to thirty-week courses developed in collaboration with twenty-five employers.
BTC and its students receive funding from the U.S. Departments of Labor, Education,
and Housing and Urban Development, the Massachusetts Departments of Education
and Employment and Training, Bay State Skills Corporation, and private foundations.
BTC graduated its first welding class in 1978. It had graduated 350 students by 1980,
by 1989 it had 2,500 graduates, and its courses included medical secretary, machine
tool setup and operation, and business machine service.
Of the two drydocks maintained, one is used for ship repairs and the other, a very
large one, EDIC hopes will be used to manufacture or finish the steel tubes for the
future third harbor tunnel.
The Army Base portion consisted mainly of a single massive 1.65 million-square-
foot (38 acre) building that is longer than Boston's Prudential Tower is high. The build-
ing houses the Boston Design Center, a wholesale center for residential and commer-
cial design and furnishing trades; the Bronstein Industrial Center, which leases light
industrial space, and Drydock center for manufacturing and graphic arts. The Army
Base was redeveloped with:
EDIC tax-exempt industrial development bonds purchased
by State Street Bank of Boston $5,900,000
Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) 3% interest loan 3,644,000
Boston Harbor Limited Partnership sale of investment shares 3,200,000
HUD Section 108 loan 2,200,000
HUD Community Development Block Grant funds 1 ,500,000
Massachusetts Public Works Grant 600,000
City of Boston General Obligation Bonds 330,000
City of Boston Neighborhood Development Fund grant 285,000
Department of Defense Office of Economic Adjustment grant 125,000
Total $17,784,000
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Source: Department of Defense, Office of Economic Adjustment, Civilian Reuse of Former Mili-
tary Bases (c. 1990); EDIC, "Boston Base Closing Meant Business," 1991; MGLB Annual Reports,
1978, 1980; my experience as fiscal manager for Boston's UDAG grants and other federal funds.
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Appendix E
Jobs with Peace and Regional Science Research Institute Methodology
In its 1985 Massachusetts and its Military Industry, Massachusetts Jobs with Peace
(JWP) estimated that there were 73,000 direct and 31,000 indirect military jobs in Mas-
sachusetts, a total of 107,000 jobs, or 3.75 percent of all those employed in the state.
The data do not exist to enable accurate computation of direct and indirect (suppli-
ers to military businesses and bases) military employment. One reason is that there
are hardly any data on subcontracting by firms receiving military R and D and produc-
tion prime contract awards. Based on various assumptions, Jobs with Peace estimated
that subcontracting out of and into the state equaled each other and produced a zero
net employment effect.
JWP broke down prime contract awards into four-digit standard industrial classi-
fications and fed the data into the University of Massachusetts at Amherst's Regional
Science Research Institute's input-output model of the state's economy. No computa-
tions were necessary for direct uniformed and civilian employment at military bases,
since these numbers are provided by the Pentagon. Various assumptions were used
to pick multipliers for indirect jobs generated by bases and by private industry.
JWP estimated that the time lag between awarding of prime contract and expendi-
ture of the funds in R and D and production averaged about one and a half years. Thus
the 1985 employment estimate was based on 1983 prime contract awards. In constant
1982 dollars, Massachusetts prime contract awards were just under $6 billion in 1983,
peaked at just under $8 billion in 1 986, and dropped to just over $6 billion in 1 988. My
estimates in the "Military Taxes and Jobs" section are based on factoring the computa-
tions from the earlier study, assuming that 1990 employment reflects 1988 prime con-
tract awards.
In one reality check, JWP noted that Raytheon Corporation, the state's largest mili-
tary contractor (31% of Massachusetts prime contract awards in 1983), announced in
1984 Boston Globe advertisements and articles that they employed 40,000 in Mas-
sachusetts, 19,000 of whom were doing full-time military work. Computed according
to JWP's methodology, Raytheon's 1984 military employment was 18,000.
Data Resources, Inc. (DRI), the prestigious Lexington, Massachusetts, economic
forecasting and analysis firm, is the regional source that the press and most studies
rely on for estimates of military employment in New England. The Jobs with Peace
study compared DRI's methodology with its own and noted that DRI estimated the mil-
itary employment share of the Massachusetts work force about 2 percent higher than
JPW did — just under 6 percent instead of just under 4 percent. However, DRI consis-
tently overestimated in the 1980s by not allowing for a time lag between prime con-
tract awards and the actual expenditure of funds in workplaces. Had DRI taken this into
account, its estimates would have been about 1 percent instead of 2 percent higher
than JWP's.
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1. Rebecca Stevens, Peter Dreier, and Jeff Brown, From a Military to a Housing Buildup: The
Impact in Boston of a Six Percent Shift in the Federal Budget from the Military to Housing
(Boston: Boston Redevelopment Authority, 1989).
2. Thomas Bodenheimer, "Public or Private? The Way to Real Health Security," and Andrew
Kopkind, "National Health Care: Seizing the Historic Moment," in The Nation, December 16,
1991. These companion articles do a fine job of condensing the confusion regarding the
plethora of health care reform proposals drifting in the wind. Bodenheimer, a physician,
explains that there are basically two options being proposed.
One option is a reform that leaves the present system intact and adds, in varying degrees,
some public coverage for the poor who are now not covered, and adds coverage for currently
uncovered employees by forcing their employers to cover them, or pay into a coverage pool.
This option will not contain spiraling costs, but will increase them. So far, increasing costs
has meant great hardship for workers and companies alike in paying insurance and nonreim-
bursed health expenses. Increasing costs has also meant reduced coverage. Forty percent of
the poor are now covered, whereas 70 percent were formerly covered. More firms are refus-
ing to cover employees or shifting more of the cost to the employee.
Under this system, as with the present system, at least 25 percent ($175 billion) of 1991
national health care expenditures of $700 billion went for administration — hundreds of insur-
ance companies, hospitals, and doctors pushing paper back and forth at one another.
The second option, a health security system, would retain the current private health care
system but replace private insurance with public insurance. As the Canadian and German sys-
tems demonstrate, this approach can stop the rapid rise in health care costs. Bodenheimer
says that the first option would cost $50 to $80 billion more per year, but that the health
security system would save $67 billion per year (mostly in administration) for a net difference
of $1 17 to $147 billion per year. This difference is roughly equal to the entire peace dividend
projected for the coming years.
Regardless of the health care merits or demerits of the two approaches, there will probably
be no shifted military funds available for anything other than health care unless the health
security approach is adopted.
3. Michael Frisby, "Pressure Rises for a New U.S. Budget," Boston Globe, September 13, 1991, 3.
4. David Bond, "Kremlin Cabal's Failure Fuels Defense Budget Debate in U.S.," Aviation Week &
Space Technology, August 26, 1991.
5. Ibid.
6. This is, in my opinion, the most accurate and sensible definition of federal military spending
around, and is the definition used by Military Research Services, Inc. (MRS), among others. It
includes the government's own definition, which is the "defense function": the budget of the
Department of Defense (DOD); the nuclear weapons development and production budget of
the Department of Energy (DOE); and the defense-related activities of several small programs,
such as Selective Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Ready
Reserve Fleet (1989, $298.3 billion).
In addition to defense function, the MRS definition I am using includes International
Security Assistance (1989, $2.8 billion); military activities of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (1989, $1.1 billion); and military-related interest on the federal debt
(1989, $51 billion — about half of all 1989 debt payments).
7. While quality-of-life comparisons are more difficult, employment comparisons resulting
from federal spending alternatives are quantifiable. Some sources include publications of the
federal Department of Commerce's Bureau of Labor Statistics; various books and articles by
Seymore Melman and associates; various publications of Employment Research Associates;
and the Jobs with Peace study Massachusetts and Its Military Industry.
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8. Massachusetts and Its Military Industry (Boston: Massachusetts Jobs with Peace, 1986).
See Appendix E of this article for a summary explanation of the Jobs with Peace employment
computation methodology.
9. Diane Lewis, "Report: N.E. Lost 250,000 Jobs in '90," Boston Globe, February 28, 1991, 45.
A July 1991 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics report stated that Massachusetts had lost 175,000
jobs in the year ending in mid-1991, and 313,000 in the past two years. That equals nearly one
out of every ten jobs in the state (Charles Stein, "Massachusetts' Job Losses Continue to
Break Records," Boston Globe, August 4, 1991, 93). In the recession of 1974-1975, the
state lost 4.7 percent of its jobs; in 1981-1982, 1.9 percent; between June 1989 and June
1991, 9.9 percent. Between June 1990 and June 1991, Massachusetts lost 5.8 percent of its
jobs, a higher rate of loss than any other state in the nation. During that year Maine lost 5.4
percent, New Hampshire 5.3 percent, Rhode Island 4.3 percent, Vermont 4.1 percent, and
Connecticut 2.5 percent. The only state in the nation with a loss greater than any of the six
New England states was New Jersey, with 2.7 percent (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics).
Most professional studies and press articles in the past twenty years have overstated the
military dependence of the New England economy on military spending. See Appendix C for
my critique of a typical example, published at the end of 1991, Richard Barf's "The Pentagon
and the Cities."
1 0. See Appendix D of this article for detailed accounts of the conversion of three Boston military
bases to civilian use: the Charlestown Naval Shipyard and its South Boston Naval Annex, and
the South Boston Army Base.
1 1
.
Boston Mayor Raymond Flynn thinks that the S and L bailout will cost $500 billion (Nancy
Walser, "Make the Rich Pay for S&L's, say Flynn, Rep. Kennedy, Others," Boston Globe, 1991).
According to Congressman Kennedy, a member of the House Committee on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs, data from the General Accounting Office and the Office of Management
and Budget indicate that under the present bailout legislation, the total cost could be $1.4
trillion, $913 billion of which would be interest on borrowed funds. There is no question that
the administration and Congress are handling the bailout in a manner designed to conceal the
costs to the taxpayers. If, as Congressman Kennedy's proposed legislation would require, the
bailout were primarily paid for out of current revenues over the next few years, the cost would
be a minor fraction of what it will be under the present approach, which is primarily using
borrowed funds and spreading the cost far into the future — at high interest rates. See
Kennedy's "Who Should Pay for the S&L Bailout?" New York Times, September 21, 1990.
Housing scholar Michael Stone of the University of Massachusetts at Boston estimates that
at the $500 billion figure, Boston residents will fork over $3.2 billion (one third of the city's
annual budget, $5,600 per resident). The $77 billion appropriated for the 1990 S and L bailout
cost Boston taxpayers $175 million ($300 per resident).
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